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I. INTRODUCTION: THE FOG OF LAW
Lawyers and lawmakers inhabit a vast fog of law,1 a surreal realm
of uncertainty and doubt about the past, present, and future. We are
often uncertain and deeply divided about the historical facts and causal
factors that have brought us to the present. We disagree sharply over
virtually any effort to describe or characterize the present. And we are
even more uncertain about what the future may hold. We can only guess
about the future consequences of both individual and government
action—or non-action.
Since almost all legal decisions are made under such conditions of
radical uncertainty about the past, present, and future, legal rules and
outcomes often rest on a patchwork of predictions and unprovable
assumptions driven by science, superstition, self-interest, ideology,
hope, and fear. Operating within such a chaotic environment of radical
uncertainty, error deflection rules that instruct lawmakers, lawyers, and
judges about how to behave in the absence of various degrees of
certainty that sometimes cannot be achieved necessarily assume

*Norman Dorsen Professor in Civil Liberties at New York University School of Law.
1 The notion of a “fog of law” is, of course, a play on the well-known phrase “fog of
war” coined in the nineteenth century by Baron von Klauswitz to describe the situational
uncertainties of military combat. I am far from the first person to talk of a fog of law.
See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2010).
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enormous practical importance.2 Indeed, I believe that it is error
deflection, not substantive knowledge, that most often guides us
through the fog of law.
Judicial promulgation and enforcement of enhanced error
deflection rules in the context of speech regulation, dating from Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s celebrated dissent in Abrams v. United
States,3 is the subject of this essay. Unlike many celebrated students of
the power of judges to set aside the actions of democratically legitimate

2 Error deflection rules operate in those legal settings where we acknowledge the
existence of significant risk of error and wish to ensure that, when mistakes inevitably
occur, we will err in one direction, as opposed to another. Enhanced burden of proof
rules are the most common methods of deflecting error. I discuss the role of error
deflection in protecting rights in Burt Neuborne, The Origin of Rights: Constitutionalism,
the Stork, and the Democratic Dilemma, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY 187 (Shimon
Shetreet ed., 1988) [hereinafter Origin of Rights].
3 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The direct appeal from the
District Court in Abrams was argued on October 21 and 22, 1919. The Supreme Court
majority and dissenting opinions appeared on November 10, eighteen days later, exactly
one year after Armistice Day, celebrating the signing of the armistice that ended armed
hostilities in WWI. No trial transcript exists. The best summary of the trial before Judge
Clayton (who was brought in from Alabama to preside; while in Congress, Clayton had
drafted the Clayton Anti-Trust Act) appears in Zachariah Chafee, Jr., A Contemporary
State Trial—The United States Versus Jacob Abrams Et Al., 33 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1920)
[hereinafter Chafee 1920], citing to contemporary sources. According to Chafee, Judge
Clayton was relentlessly hostile to the defendants, Jacob Abrams, Samuel Lipman,
Hyman Lachowsky, Molly Steimer, Gabriel Prober, and Hyman Rosansky, all of whom
were non-citizen Russian emigrants in their twenties. Id. at 750, 755–57. Clayton
repeatedly indicated his belief in the defendants’ guilt and his embrace of the
government’s legal theory that replaced a requirement of proof of specific intent to bring
about unlawful behavior with a general intent to utter words having even a mild
tendency to frustrate the war effort. Id. at 755–57, 761. One original defendant, Jacob
Schwartz (who wrote the Yiddish leaflet), died mysteriously the day before the trial
began while in military custody. Id. at 750. Judge Clayton refused to investigate charges
that Schwartz had been beaten to death. Id. at 761–62. Prober was acquitted. Abrams,
Lipman, and Lachowsky were sentenced to the maximum of twenty years under the
1918 Amendments to the 1917 Espionage Act and fined $1000 on each of the
indictment’s four counts. Id. at 763. Molly Steimer was sentenced to fifteen years and a
$500 fine. Id. Rosansky, who had dumped the leaflets from the tenement window,
received a three-year sentence in recognition of his cooperation in identifying the other
defendants. Id.
Chafee had already published an influential law review article in June 1919, arguing that
the First Amendment required both convincing proof of specific intent to cause a
violation of law, and convincing evidentiary proof that the targeted speech posed an
unacceptable level of risk of imminent lawless action. See Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom
of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919) [hereinafter Chafee 1919]. Holmes’s
dissent in Abrams, after having written an unfortunate majority opinion in Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), upholding Debs’s conviction for delivering a speech in which
he praised draft resistors, was clearly influenced by Chafee’s 1919 article and by a
personal meeting with Chafee during the summer of 1919.
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institutions,4 I do not believe that judicial invalidation of (1) statutes
enacted by duly elected legislatures, (2) administrative actions taken by
duly serving executives, and/or (3) verdicts issued by randomly
selected juries are necessarily rooted in a judge’s allegedly superior
ability to identify and define substantive rights codified in a
constitutional or statutory text.5 Rather, I believe that the vast bulk of
judicial power to check democratic institutions rests on the articulation
and enforcement of judge-made error deflection rules designed to
manage the inevitable risk of error that pervades the fog of law. The
practical impact of such error deflection rules in a world of uncertainty
is to limit or prevent action by democratic institutions in the absence of
a judicially defined requisite degree of confidence about the justification
for, the need for, or the consequences of governmental action in
derogation of textually articulated constitutional values.6 I believe that
it is in the regulatory dead space created by impossibly demanding error
reflection rules that the free exercise of autonomy-based rights
flourishes.
II. OF SYLLOGISM MACHINES AND THE FOG OF LAW
I’ve taught Civil Procedure and Evidence for almost fifty years at
NYU Law School.7 A staple of both courses has been the description,
analysis, and critique of the power of judges, especially unelected
judges, to shape, preclude, and, occasionally, override jury verdicts.8 At
4 Among the thoughtful, indeed brilliant efforts to think about rights as “things”
described in a text, as opposed to the de facto outcome of a process, see RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); and Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
5 Since I do not believe that rights are necessarily embedded in ambiguous texts, I
need not wade into the perplexing question of how to read ambiguous texts like the
forty-five words of the First Amendment. For my take on reading the First Amendment,
see BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2015) [hereinafter
MADISON’S MUSIC].
6 See Origin of Rights, supra note 2, at 199–203.
7 I ask forgiveness here for a bout of nostalgia occasioned by my decision to retire
from full-time teaching at NYU after forty-nine years, at the close of the Fall 2020
semester. I owe an enormous debt to my colleagues and students at NYU who have
combined over the years to sustain an environment of mutual respect and intellectual
commitment, enabling me to enjoy almost every minute in my classrooms and the
faculty library.
8 The Sixth and Seventh Amendments are designed to reserve the crucial power of
adjudicative fact-finding to the people, speaking through a randomly selected, neutral
jury that is fundamentally representative of the community. The jury’s obvious
democratic roots hark back to the process of random selection of officials in Athenian
democracy, often called “sortition.”
See Sortition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/sortition (last visited Aug. 1, 2020). In fact, service
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the same time, for the past half-century, I’ve taught Federal Courts and,
less often, Constitutional Law at NYU, Stanford, Texas, Berkeley, and CalIrvine, exploring the power of judges, especially unelected judges, to
shape and, occasionally, override legislative and executive actions.9
Although the two exercises of judicial authority take place in different
legal realms, each involves the exercise of power by an (often) unelected
judge to shape and, if necessary, override the judgments of a
democratically legitimate institution—the randomly selected jury in
one set of cases; a duly elected legislature in the other.10 Both exercises
of judicial power to check the popular will rely heavily on the
enunciation and enforcement of a judge-made set of error deflection
rules—the “burdens of proof” in the jury context and what I call the
“burdens of justification” in the legislative realm—that guide us through
the fog of law.
I hope in this brief essay, stimulated by the excellent symposium
held in November 2019 at Columbia Law School celebrating the 100th
birthday of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s memorable dissent in
Abrams, to highlight the extent to which current judicial checks on the
power of democratic institutions to interfere with free speech rest on
the willingness of judges to impose stringent error deflection rules on
democratic institutions—juries and legislatures alike. I will argue, as
well, that since judicially imposed error deflection rules inevitably
reflect a judicial value judgment about risk management in specific
settings, the decision of what level of error deflection to mandate may—
and should—vary in different contexts. When, for example, following
the path begun in Abrams, a contemporary judge declares a statute in
violation of the First Amendment, it is most often because the judge
finds that government has failed to carry the government’s heavy
“burden of justification,” an error deflection rule at the legislative level
on a jury is one of the three times in our democracy that a citizen exercises direct
governing power, as opposed to delegating the power to an elected representative. The
other two times are voting and service in the institutions of armed coercion—the
military and the police. Despite the jury’s powerful democratic pedigree, however, it is
routine for judges to intervene in its deliberations by filtering the evidence, instructing
juries on the law and burden of persuasion, cutting certain cases off from the jury,
directing verdicts, and setting verdicts aside. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 51. The apogee
of the jury’s power is reached in criminal cases, where the Sixth Amendment precludes
judges from seizing control of the fact-finding process by directing verdicts of guilt. Even
in criminal cases, though, judges exercise a significant degree of control over juries by
supervising jury selection, deciding what evidence the jurors may hear, instructing them
on the law and the heightened burden of persuasion, and directing verdicts of innocence.
See Theodore W. Phillips, Note, The Motion for Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 YALE
L.J. 1151 (1961).
9 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
10 I noted the common characteristics in Origin of Rights, supra note 2, at 198–203.
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reflecting a judicial value judgment about risk management in the
context of a clash between constitutionally recognized values of free
speech and constitutionally legitimate concerns about security,
efficiency, and order.11 For reasons aptly described in the Abrams
dissent and its long progeny, when such a clash occurs, it makes
excellent sense to deflect error dramatically in favor of free speech. 12
But when the value clash changes, pitting values like reputation and
equality against free speech, it is, I believe, a mistake to reflexively
borrow the dramatically pro-speech error deflection rules from the
Abrams context and use them to resolve other clashes. Each set of
clashes deserves its own error deflection rules.
I confess that I’m not sure whether First Amendment regulations
designed to protect the equality and autonomy interests of weak
hearers and targets should be measured against the disabling error
deflection rules designed to control censorship in the name of security,
efficiency, and order. The Holmes dissent in Abrams, for all its brilliance
and importance in protecting free speech against suppression in the
name of order, efficiency, and security, does not answer that important
question, in large part, because we have never asked it.
III. THE SYLLOGISM MACHINES AT WORK: IDENTIFYING THE RAW MATERIAL
FOR POTENTIAL ERROR DEFLECTION
The vast bulk of lawmaking in our democracy consists of decisions
by democratically authorized actors13 empowered to identify important
11 The Abrams dissent is the earliest example of such First Amendment error
deflection at the level of the Supreme Court. A year earlier, Judge Learned Hand had
flirted with the technique in his opinion in Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (1917),
stay granted, 245 F. 102, rev’d, 246 F. 24 (1917). See Burt Neuborne, A Tale of Two
Hands: One Clapping; One Not, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 831 (2018) (comparing Learned Hand’s
pioneer District Court opinion in the Masses with his disappointing Second Circuit
opinion thirty-three years later upholding the criminal convictions of leaders of the
American Communist Party in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d,
341 U.S. 494 (1951)). As we’ll see, infra, enhanced First Amendment error deflection
does not emerge as a fully formed Supreme Court doctrine until Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). I briefly describe the emergence and operation of
error deflection and the degree to which it permeates modern free speech protection
infra Part IV.
12 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13 Two sets of democratically authorized lawmakers exist—legislators and
executives. I omit the task of finding a democratic pedigree for judges—elected and nonelected. I tried to posit one in BURT NEUBORNE, WHEN AT TIMES THE MOB IS SWAYED 135–38
(2019). It is easy to describe the democratic pedigree of elected legislators and elected
executives. It is somewhat more difficult to posit a democratic pedigree for
administrative officials appointed by members of the Executive branch, especially when
they are shielded from day-to-day supervision by elected officials. In Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), the Supreme Court struck down the
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collective interests and impose legal rules designed to use the carrot and
the stick to channel individual behavior toward preserving and
advancing those interests. The process of making and enforcing the
laws usually takes the form of two linked syllogisms.14 Syllogism I (the
lawmaking phase) is constructed at the legislative or executive level by
elected representatives of the people or by an appointed administrator
who answers to an elected official. The major premise of Syllogism I
consists of the articulation of a worthy collective interest, X; the minor
premise assesses and describes the impact of behavior, Y, on collective
interest X. The conclusion spits out a new rule of law, Z, mandating,
encouraging, or forbidding behavior Y because of its assumed impact on
collective interest X.
Syllogism I is almost always permissive, allowing but not
compelling legislative or executive action. Indeed, much of what passes
for debate in our legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies
consists of (1) disagreement over the existence or importance of the
asserted collective interest, (2) uncertainty about the impact that
varieties of targeted behavior will have on the collective interest, and
(3) disagreement about whether potentially fairer or more effective
rules of law (or no rule at all) will do a better job of advancing the
collective interest. So, a law banning homicide begins with the
consideration of the collective interests threatened by homicide;
continues with the identification of the varieties of homicide deemed
most threatening to the collective interests; and ends with the
enunciation of a law forbidding certain forms of homicide.
Syllogism II (the implementation phase) usually unfolds at the
adjudicative level. It governs efforts to apply and enforce the legal Rule
Z established in Syllogism I. In fact, the major premise of Syllogism II is
Rule Z, the conclusion of Syllogism I. The minor premise of Syllogism II
consists of a historical reconstruction of a defendant’s past behavior, Y,
and an assessment of whether the reconstructed behavior violates Rule
Z. The conclusion, verdict Z, declares whether Rule Z has been violated.
If Rule Z is found to have been violated, the implementation process
effort by Congress to create a single autonomous head of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau removable by the President only for cause, ruling that, as a matter of
separation of powers, a single appointed official heading an administrative agency must
be subject to Presidential removal to assure the democratic legitimacy of the agency’s
actions.
14 I have written about the syllogistic nature of lawmaking and law enforcement in
Origin of Rights, supra note 2, and Burt Neuborne, Serving the Syllogism Machine, 44 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1 (2011). See also MADISON’S MUSIC, supra note 5. This is, however, the first
time I have sought to describe lawmaking and law enforcement as two integrated
syllogisms.
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moves to the remedial phase—sentencing, the setting of damages, or the
issuance of equitable relief.
Once a prosecutor or regulator decides to kick Syllogism II into
motion, it proceeds without the repeated discretionary branching
points present in Syllogism I. Thus, the prosecution of Neuborne for
speeding on the Long Island Expressway presents a major premise
consisting of the statutory 55 mph speed limit, continues with a minor
premise stating how fast Neuborne was clocked on the radar gun, and
culminates in an inexorable statement of conclusion as to guilt or
innocence. Such a simple version of Syllogism II is, of course, relatively
rare. Far more often, the parties disagree over the meaning of the major
premise (interpreting the text) and the content of the minor premise
(the historical facts of the defendant’s behavior). Once, however, the
major and minor premises of Syllogism II are formally and finally locked
into place, the verdict/conclusion is inexorable.
If it were possible to know the future or the past with any degree
of certainty, making and implementing Syllogisms I and II would be
relatively easy. Lawmaking would consist of charting the predictable
consequences of a range of known potential individual, corporate,
and/or government actions (or inactions), and engaging in informed
discussions about what behavior law should encourage; what behavior
it should ignore; and what behavior it should deter, and by how much.
Similarly, adjudication would announce with confidence whether a
defendant’s known past behavior violated Rule Z, and speedily issue a
logically compelled verdict. Alas, however, in the complex fog of law we
inhabit, the future and the past are very often—perhaps almost
always—shrouded in disagreement and uncertainty. Much of the time,
lawmakers and enforcers decide to make and/or enforce (or not make
and fail to enforce) legal rules (or the absence of rules) based on guesses
about both the likely consequences of the behavior at issue and the
historical facts underlying the controversy.
The unavoidable
consequence of being forced to govern within the fog of law requires an
acknowledgment that we can be wrong about almost everything. Once
we acknowledge the existence of such a widespread risk of error, we
must decide whether and how to manage the risk. That, in turn, leads to
a set of error deflection rules based on value judgments about how to
behave when we are not sure about the correctness of the major and
minor premises in both Syllogisms I and II.
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Most of the time, the legal system acknowledges the risk of error
inherent in the fog of law but does not seek to skew error in a particular
direction, other than marginally favoring the status quo.15 We deem
wide swaths of lawmaking and implementation valid as long as it is
based on a good faith, rational assessment of the likely future
consequences of the regulated behavior on legitimate collective goals
and a good faith, rational exploration and reconstruction of the
defendant’s past behavior. Under such an anemic risk management
approach, lawmakers and juries can be wrong in any direction they wish
as long as they act rationally and free from forbidden motives in making
guesses about the past and the future. I believe that’s what happens in
the vast bulk of lawmaking governed by what the Supreme Court calls
“rational basis” review and implementation under a correctly
administered “preponderance of the evidence” standard.16
Sometimes, though, especially when constitutional values are in
play, we deflect error in both Syllogisms I and II in favor of a cherished
value or to protect a vulnerable group by requiring enhanced levels of
certainty from government officials before locking in either or both of
the major and minor premises. Most obviously, where “life” and
“liberty” are at stake in a criminal prosecution, we radically deflect error
at the level of the minor premise in Syllogism II in favor of life and liberty
by construing the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the jury trial clause of the Sixth Amendment to
require the state to prove the historical facts constituting each element
of a criminal offense “beyond a reasonable doubt.”17 We know that there
will be mistakes during the jury’s Syllogism II fact-finding process, no
15 All burden of proof rules skew outcomes in one direction or another. The least
demanding standard, preponderance of the evidence, means that ties result in
perpetuation of the pre-litigation status quo as between the parties. The more
demanding the burden of proof, the greater the number of cases that will be affected by
uncertainty. In settings where a demanding burden is, as a practical matter,
insurmountable, stringent error deflection can operate as a de facto rule of law making
it all but impossible for the burdened party to obtain legal redress against the benefitted
party. To my mind, that comes very close to describing contemporary free speech
protection.
16 Since the New Deal, most legislative judgments are subject to judicial review
under a low bar of good faith and rationality—a standard of review that acknowledges
the possibility of error but makes no significant effort to deflect the error in a particular
substantive direction. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (establishing the borders of rational basis scrutiny); Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–58 (1981) (discussing burdens of persuasion and
production under Title VII).
17 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (imposing burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in any prosecution involving potential loss of liberty).
Justice Harlan’s concurrence has been particularly persuasive. Id. at 368–75 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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matter how carefully it takes place. Once such an inescapable risk of
error is acknowledged, the issue shifts to how to manage the risks to
liberty and security, respectively, of wrongful conviction and/or
erroneous acquittal. The Supreme Court’s answer, at least since
Winship, has been to deflect error radically in favor of liberty and against
security by requiring an extremely high level of confidence in the factual
accuracy of a guilty verdict before the minor premise in Syllogism II can
be announced.18
Deprivation of parental status,19 civil commitment,20 and
deportation21 also carry enhanced burdens of proof at the level of
Syllogism II’s minor premise, requiring “clear and convincing” evidence
of historical facts—less demanding than “reasonable doubt,” but more
certain than “preponderance.” Judges routinely police the boundaries
of such enhanced Syllogism II error deflection, instructing the parties
and the jury about the risk of non-persuasion and the required levels of
certainty;22 setting aside jury verdicts that violate error deflection
rules;23 and refusing to permit inadequately proven factual issues from
going to the jury at all.24
Judges occasionally stray into more controversial waters by
imposing enhanced error deflection rules on legislators at the level of
the major and minor premises in Syllogism I. The difference, of course,
is between interfering with legislators, as opposed to juries. For
example, since Carolene Products, in settings where a member of a
“discrete and insular minorit[y]”25 is intentionally harmed by
governmental action, the Court has imposed demanding burdens of
justification on Syllogism I’s major premise by requiring the articulation
of a “compelling governmental interest”; and on Syllogism I’s minor

18

Interestingly, we do not impose any degree of enhanced error deflection to
protect “property,” the third value in the Due Process trilogy.
19 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (imposing minimum burden of
clear and convincing evidence).
20 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (imposing minimum burden of clear
and convincing evidence).
21 Woodby v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966) (imposing
clear and convincing burden of proof standard).
22 An incorrect or confusing jury charge is almost always grounds for reversal unless
the error is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Francis v. Franklin, 471
U.S. 307, 316–18 (1985) (confusing jury charge on issue of intent); Rose v. Clark, 478
U.S. 570, 583 (1986) (applying harmless error to confusing jury charge on intent).
23 The judge’s power to police error deflection rules by ordering new trials, directing
verdicts, or setting verdicts aside is noted supra at note 8
24 See United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 244–45 (2d Cir. 1972) (defining
government’s production burden in criminal cases).
25 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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premise by requiring convincing evidence that the challenged law is
necessary to advance the compelling interest.26 Given the uncertainty
that is almost always present in the fog of law, it is almost impossible for
a law or regulation to satisfy such demanding “strict scrutiny.”27
As with Syllogism II,28 less dramatic error deflection than “strict
scrutiny” is also possible at the level of Syllogism I. Forms of
“heightened scrutiny” that fall short of “strict scrutiny,” but exceed
“rational basis” seek to deflect error in settings like gender equality in
carefully calibrated efforts to impose varying degrees of certainty on
government before it acts.29
IV. ABRAMS AND ENHANCED ERROR DEFLECTION
The five defendants30 in Abrams were charged in a single
conspiracy indictment with four counts of circulating approximately
5,000 copies of two leaflets—one in English and one in Yiddish—in
violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended in 1918.31 Both
26 See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (invalidating ban on inter-racial
marriage); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (invalidating
race-based affirmative action provisions despite lack of racial animus).
27 It is, however, not impossible. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 213,
218–19 (1944) (upholding race-based internment camps during WWII). The Supreme
Court purportedly overruled Korematsu in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423
(2018) when five Justices upheld President Trump’s unilateral imposition of a travel ban
on nationals of seven predominantly Muslim nations. Unfortunately, despite the Court’s
protestations to the contrary, Trump v. Hawaii reaffirms the government’s power to
stereotype on the basis of race and religion. Sadly, therefore, I fear that the ghost of
Korematsu still walks.
28 See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text for discussion of “clear and
convincing” error deflection in constructing the minor premise of Syllogism II.
29 For examples of less demanding error deflection rules at the level of Syllogism I,
see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204–05 (1976) (heightened scrutiny for gender) and
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 437 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (“energized” rational
basis review in zoning cases involving weak groups).
30 See Chafee 1920, supra note 3, at 749–50 for a brief description of the Abrams
defendants.
31 The 1918 Amendments, sometimes called the Sedition Act of 1918, substantially
expanded the 1917 statute, and significantly increased the penalties. The 1918
amendments read as follows:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, . . . shall willfully utter,
print, write, or publish
(Count 1) any disloyal, . . . scurrilous, or abusive language about
the form of government of the United States, . . .
(Count 2) or any language intended to bring the form of
government of the United States . . . into contempt, scorn, contumely,
or disrepute, . . .
(Count 3) or . . . any language intended to incite, provoke, or
encourage resistance to the United States [in said war with the
German Imperial Government], . . .
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leaflets attacked President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to commit
American troops, originally stationed in Europe to fight Germany, to the
invasion of post-Revolutionary Russia in an effort to topple the
Bolshevik regime.32 The English-language leaflet excoriated Wilson as a
cowardly hypocrite pretending to oppose German militarism, while
actually seeking to advance capitalism by overthrowing the Soviet
regime.33 The Yiddish-language leaflet urged recent emigrants from
Russia to refuse to support attacks on Russian workers by declining to
buy war bonds and refusing to work in munitions plants.34
Closely tracking the language of the amended 1918 version of the
Espionage Act, Count One charged the defendants with conspiracy to
circulate abusive language about the form of government of the United
States.35 Count Two alleged a conspiracy to circulate language intended
to bring the American form of government into disrepute.36 Count
Three charged the defendants with conspiracy to circulate language
generally detrimental to the war effort.37 Count Four charged the
defendants with conspiracy to circulate language interfering with the
production of essential war materiel.38
Justice Clarke’s opinion for seven members of the Court made short
work of defendants’ appeals from their 15–20-year sentences. Clarke
ruled that it was unnecessary to review or uphold the validity of the
convictions under each of the four counts as long as a valid conviction
on a single count would justify the 15–20 year sentences.39 Modern
(Count 4) or shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing,
publication, . . . urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of
production in this country of any thing or things, product or products
[to wit, ordnance and ammunition] necessary or essential to the
prosecution of the war in which the United States may be engaged,
[to wit, said war with the Imperial German Government], with intent
by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the
prosecution of the war, . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more
than twenty years or both.
Chafee 1920, supra note 3, at 750–51 (alterations in original). Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 all involved prosecutions under the original version of the
Espionage Act of 1917.
32 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619–23 (1919).
33 See id. at 619–20 (Justice Clarke’s description).
34 Id. at 620–23.
35 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 619. Even under his dubious ground rules, Justice Clarke’s refusal to
confront Counts One and Two seems indefensible, since Abrams, Lipman, and Lachofsky
were each fined $1000 on all four counts. See Chafee 1920, supra note 3, at 763.

NEUBORNE (DO NOT DELETE)

252

10/13/2020 11:10 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:241

criminal procedure would almost certainly reject such a cavalier
approach to the possibility of prejudice from potentially
unconstitutional convictions under two, and possibly three, of the four
counts.40 At a minimum, a remand for resentencing solely under the
valid counts would be required,41 to say nothing of careful attention to
the extent to which the jury’s deliberations on the valid count may have
been improperly affected by the invalid counts.42 Although Clarke was
content to focus on Count Four, holding that it was sufficient to justify
the sentence, he could not stop himself from delivering a lecture on the
pernicious consequences of speech challenging the validity of both the
American form of government and a capitalist economic system.43 As a
strict legal matter, though, while Count Four’s allegations involving
interference with the production of armaments were based on a valid
major premise for Syllogism I lawmaking, a desire to insulate the
nation’s form of government against vigorous verbal criticism,
especially verbal criticism as feckless as the 5,000 leaflets in Abrams,
was not. Accordingly, Justice Clarke concentrated primarily on Count
Four charging defendants with speech interfering with the production
of armaments,44 an interest that Holmes agreed satisfied Schenck at the
level of the major premise of Syllogism I.45 Justice Clarke then adopted
a minor premise for Syllogism II that characterized the Yiddish leaflet as
posing a threat to armaments production.46 Accordingly, he dutifully
spat out a conclusion of guilty.47

40

As Justice Holmes’s dissent argues, even under the tender mercies of Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs, Counts One and Two in Abrams, alleging speech that merely abused
and disparaged the United States form of government, were probably unconstitutional.
See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Count Three, alleging
unspecified interference with the war effort, was closer, but potentially invalid, as well.
See id. at 629. Only Count Four, alleging language threatening interference with the
manufacture of armaments, clearly alleged a facially valid offense under Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs. Id. at 626.
41 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (citing Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 367–68 (1931) for the modern Supreme Court’s concern over tainting a
conviction and sentence with unconstitutional counts). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 , 474–75 (2000), the Court explicitly rejected an argument that the possible
imposition of the identical sentence on multiple counts obviated concern over an
unconstitutional sentence imposed on one count.
42 See infra notes 22 and 41 for examples of the modern Court’s meticulous approach
to possible jury confusion and taint.
43 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621–23.
44 Id. at 624.
45 See id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 620–21 (majority opinion).
47 Id. at 624.
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Justice Holmes did not challenge Clarke’s opinion at the level of the
major premise, accepting interference with the production of
armaments as a valid major premise for both Syllogisms I and II.48 But,
instead of adopting the minor premise utilized by Justice Clarke in both
syllogisms that requires target speech to pose merely a barely plausible
threat to the government interest set forth in the major premise,49
Holmes’s revolutionary move in Abrams was to read the First
Amendment as imposing an enhanced burden of justification at the level
of the minor premise in both Syllogisms I (lawmaking) and II
(enforcement), requiring both the legislature and the jury to find that
the challenged speech at issue would have almost certainly imminently
endangered the government’s valid interest described in the major
premise.50 The “silly leaflets” before the Court in Abrams, argued
Holmes, came nowhere close to generating the requisite degree of risk
that it would have interfered with the manufacture of munitions.51
I believe that Holmes’s magnificent language in Abrams about the
contingent nature of fighting faiths and the importance of a marketplace
of ideas as the best test of truth52 is best understood as a warning against
the all too human tendency to exaggerate the threats posed by the
dissemination of feared and hated ideas. Holmes understood that both
the legislature and the jury will usually overestimate the level of threats
posed by unorthodox and unpopular ideas, so he stacked the error
deflection deck in favor of free speech by imposing heightened burden
of proof rules protecting speech against both the legislature and the
jury. Thus, for the first time in the Supreme Court, Holmes required the
government in a free speech case to identify a genuinely compelling
collective interest at the level of the major premise of Syllogism I
(Counts One and Two protecting the American form of government from
criticism did not qualify) and to satisfy a demanding minor premise
requiring proof that the speech in question will almost certainly pose an
imminent threat to the only valid major premise in Count Four.53 Only
then would Holmes have allowed the government to announce a
conclusion of guilty in a free speech case.
In effect, Holmes required proof by the legislature and the
prosecutor of a strong causal link between speech and harm by more
than a plausible likelihood. I think he may have required proof beyond
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621 (majority opinion).
See id. at 626–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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a reasonable doubt. At a minimum, though, the evidence proving the
causal link must be clear and convincing. Even “more likely than not”
will not do. That, of course, is pure error deflection in favor of speech,
not all that different from liberty-based error deflection in Winship.54
Risky, of course; no doubt, occasionally harmful. But as with the due
process rule in Winship requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt,55 the risk is, to my mind, unquestionably worth the cost—at least
in settings where free speech collides with concerns over security,
efficiency, and order.
It took almost forty years until the per curiam decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,56 but the error deflection seed planted by Justice
Holmes in his Abrams dissent eventually became the core of the
Supreme Court’s current densely-packed and extremely protective First
Amendment jurisprudence. Today, a would-be censor confronts a
fearsome judicially imposed and administered burden of justification at
least four times: (1) identification of a sufficiently important
government interest,57 (2) proof that the speech at issue is extremely
likely to injure the government interest,58 (3) proof that the injury is
imminent,59 and (4) proof that no less drastic means exist to protect or
advance the government interest.60 Lingering doubt about any one of
the four results in invalidation of the effort to censor. In addition, the
Court has established five procedural sets of free speech protections: (1)
an impossibly high burden of justification on prior restraints;61 (2) a
54

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970).
Id. at 361.
56 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
57 The Court has rejected concerns over littering as sufficiently important to justify
curbing leafletting and has resolutely refused to decide whether promotion of political
equality is a sufficiently important collective interest to warrant limits on the campaign
spending of the very rich. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161–62 (1939)
(leafletting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976).
58 I have argued that the collapse of First Amendment protections under
McCarthyism stemmed from the failure of American judges at every level to enforce
error deflection at the level of the minor premise in Syllogisms I and II. Flatly ignoring
Hand’s warning in Abrams, the Dennis Court explicitly deferred to Congress’s legislative
assessment of imminent danger posed by the mere existence of the American
Communist Party. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17. The doctrinal
importance of Brandenburg is its repudiation of Dennis’s failure to enforce strict proof
of causation rules at the level of the minor premise of both Syllogisms I and II. See
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48.
59 The required imminence of any threatened harm is discussed in Brown v. Ent.
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–801 (2011) (invalidating ban on sale of violent video
games to minors in absence of strong evidence of convincing harm).
60 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45.
61 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (enhanced burden
of justification for prior restraint).
55
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facial ban on overbroad statutes;62 (3) a ban on overly vague speech
regulations;63 (4) a strict equality rule requiring content-neutral
enforcement;64 and (5) a guarantee of speedy judicial review of any
effort to censor.65 Take your pick which doctrine would blow the
Abrams prosecution out of the water today.
But what about other settings where free speech collides with
other government interests like preserving equality and protecting
reputation? In addition to littering, the Court has already rejected an
abstract interest in truth,66 preventing hurt feelings,67 and protecting
the flag68 as sufficiently weighty collective interests to justify a degree
of censorship. The Court has split the difference on reputation, rejecting
reputation itself as a sufficient interest in the context of the public
official, but recognizing an adequate interest in protecting public figures
against knowingly false attacks on reputation.69 The jury is still out on
preserving equality.70 Assuming, though, that the Supreme Court bows
to the inevitable and recognizes preservation of equality as a compelling
governmental interest, what should the error deflection rules look like
for the minor premise in Syllogisms I and II? Should we simply import
Holmes’s speech protective error deflection rules in Abrams? I think
not.
The key to Holmes’s brilliant insight in Abrams was his recognition
in his rousing “fighting faith” paragraph that, when asserted
government interests in preserving security, efficiency, and order are at
62 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (statute forbidding crossburning unconstitutionally overbroad).
63 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (statute banning “crush” movies
depicting violence against small animals unconstitutionally vague).
64 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 159 (2015) (differential regulation of
signage size unconstitutional).
65 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (requiring immediate judicial
review of administrative censorship). I discuss the Court’s First Amendment procedural
corollaries in Burt Neuborne, Where’s the Fire?, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 131 (2016).
66 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012) (invalidating conviction for
falsely claiming to have received a Congressional Medal of Honor).
67 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (invalidating conviction for wearing
jacket emblazoned with “Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courthouse).
68 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (invalidating flag-burning statute in
absence of adequate government interest).
69 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964).
70 In its campaign finance jurisprudence, the Court assumes that advancing political
equality is an adequate government interest, then invalidates the statute as
unnecessary, overbroad, discriminatory, or inadequately justified. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1976) (less drastic means available); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352–53 (2010) (differential treatment of speakers);
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 207–08 (2014) (inadequate
government interest; inadequate proof of harm).
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issue, the self-interested posture of most legislators disables them from
making objective assessments about the imminent risk posed by speech
that attacks their cozy perch at the top of the political food chain.71
Holmes, the greatest common lawyer ever to sit on the Supreme Court,
knew well Lord Coke’s maxim in Dr. Bonham’s Case72 that no person may
sit as a judge in his or her own case. It was routine at common law, as it
is today,73 to disqualify a judge for bias or interest. Unlike the
adjudicatory context, however, where a neutral judge or juror can be
substituted for a self-interested arbiter,74 as a practical matter, you can’t
recuse an entire self-interested legislature. In his ultimately triumphant
dissent in Abrams, Holmes responded to the problem of self-interested
legislative censorship in security cases by imposing stringent burdens
of justification on the self-interested legislature in Syllogism I rooted in
a second judicial opinion about the importance of the government’s
interest and a requirement of proof of a strong likelihood of harm.75 For
Holmes, failure to satisfy the two stringent burdens was a red flag
signaling the self-interested presence of improper legislative motives
and/or inadequate legislative consideration of risk.76
But such obvious legislative self-interest is not usually present
when the legislative majority acts to preserve the equality of members
of historically marginalized groups. For example, in settings where the
white male majority places limits on its workplace speech to provide
people of color, women, and LGBTQ individuals with an equal chance to
succeed in the workplace, the Court has affirmed speech regulation
since there is no need for an error deflection check on legislative selfinterest.77 In the absence of the psychological tendency to overstate
risks associated with speech attacking the hegemony of the majority,
there is no need to complicate the regulatory process by imposing error
deflection rules to counter a tendency to overregulate that simply is not
there.

71

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
73 See, e.g., Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
74 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
75 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76 Justice Kagan has expressed a similar view of the role of First Amendment
doctrine in smoking out improper motive and inadequate consideration. See Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
77 See Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 687 (1997).
72
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V. CONCLUSION
There may be other reasons to impose stringent Syllogism I error
deflection rules on campaign finance statutes limiting the spending of
the ultra-rich, but they do not flow from Holmes’s great dissent in
Abrams. It is hard enough to persuade the majority to regulate itself in
an effort to advance the interests of the politically vulnerable. We
should not make it even harder to mitigate the rigors of our deeply
unequal society by forcing ameliorative statutes to run the gauntlet of
Holmesian error deflection. I don’t think Holmes would like it.

